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The EU in the AIIB: taming China’s influence 
from within 
Fleur Huijskens, Richard Turcsanyi and Balazs Ujvari 
With the recent approval of the 
membership request of Belgium, Cyprus, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Romania, 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) will soon count 20 EU countries 
among its members. But how could the 
EU make the most of this presence in the 
bank? Apart from direct business 
opportunities for its private sector, there 
are strategic, long-term considerations too. 
It will be imperative that the EU exploit 
the link between the AIIB and the Belt and 
Road Initiative and ensure that the bank’s 
functioning remains consistent with EU 
development standards through a carefully 
co-ordinated voice within the institution.   
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their collaborative efforts recently acquired a 
new dimension: creation of international 
bodies from scratch.
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 Most prominent 
examples include the China-initiated Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and 
the BRICS-launched New Development Bank 
(NDB) as well as the Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement (CRA). Of the three new 
structures, most analytical attention has 
focused on the AIIB (proposed unilaterally by 
China) whose operational phase started in 
January 2016 with 57 founding members 
(including 14 from the EU). This policy brief 
aims to explore how the EU could deal with 
the institution and, by extension, China‟s 
growing assertiveness in the international 
system, by engaging the country from within 
the Beijing-based bank. 
 
Arguably, the EU has, in the past decade, 
gradually come to adopt a more 
accommodating approach towards China. This 
has not amounted to the EU letting go of its 
approach in its external relations as a 
„normative power‟. Rather, the 28-country bloc 
has become more strategic about its 
engagement with emerging powers, including 
China. This can, among others, be exemplified 
by the EU‟s pragmatic change of negotiation 
strategy with the country since the 2009 
Copenhagen Summit or, more recently, by the 
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With the global governance system becoming 
increasingly unrepresentative of the changed 
realities of the 21st century, emerging powers 
have been all the more proactive in seeking to 
reshape the system.  Led by China, the so-
called BRICS countries (including also Brazil, 
Russia, India and South Africa) initially sought 
– often through co-ordinated action – to 
increase their influence over established global 
governance institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank or the Financial Stability Board 
through reforms affecting membership and 
voting power considerations. Disenchanted 
with the pace and scale of reforms, however, 
their collaborative efforts recently acquired a 
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strong focus of the EU‟s „China strategy‟ on 
„engagement‟ and „reciprocity‟. In view of the 
ambivalent (though yet to be consolidated) 
attitude of the Trump administration in the 
United States (US) towards multilateral co-
operation, it is of even greater importance now 
that the EU find ways of developing further its 
strategic relations with China, which also 
cherishes vested interests in ensuring the 
viability of the multilateral system.   
 
As both the EU and China view socio-
economic development as a means to stability 
and security, the AIIB provides a good 
platform for the EU to engage with China 
from within and strengthen their strategic 
relations.  For the EU to exploit its presence 
through its member states (whose number is 
soon to reach 20)
2
 in the AIIB, this policy 
brief argues that it will be imperative to focus 
on three issue areas: geopolitical aspects of the 
bank‟s activities and their links to the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), the AIIB‟s adherence to 
EU-championed standards in international 
development policy, and finally the design of 
an effective representation pattern for EU 
member states conducive to joint action within 
the bank.  
  
GEOPOLITICS OF THE AIIB  
From an EU perspective, the AIIB‟s operation 
has a number of potential geopolitical 
implications. A key EU interest, for instance, 
concerns the AIIB‟s potential to gradually alter 
the situation where the overwhelming majority 
of land routes (including railway and road 
connections) between East Asia and Europe 
pass through Russia. In view of the AIIB 
being one of the channels financing BRI 
(whose main objective is to boost physical 
connectivity between East Asia and Europe on 
land), the EU may use its leverage within the 
bank to push for projects consistent with the 
above goal.  Should EU-China trade shift 
gradually to land routes as a result of the 
 unfolding BRI, it may be critical to ensure that 
not all such routes cross Russia lest Moscow 
acquire an additional lever of influence vis-à-
vis the EU (or China for that matter) in 
geopolitical terms thus further limiting 
Europeans‟ room for maneuver in dealing with 
Moscow.       
 
Interestingly enough, when the first BRI maps 
were circulated by the Chinese, the „belt‟ 
indeed bypassed Russia by connecting China to 
Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea/Iran, 
the South Caucasus and Turkey – one 
explanation of which may be the initial fears of 
„incompatibility‟ between the Eurasian 
Economic Union and BRI.  Only later on were 
a railway line from Istanbul to Moscow and 
two other railway routes through Russia added 
to the map. Nevertheless, any aspiration to 
secure China‟s support within the AIIB for 
connectivity projects bypassing Russia must be 
looked at against the background of 
presumably contrary intentions from the 
Russian side.
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One way to underpin a strategic EU approach 
towards the AIIB may concern   the rethinking 
of the 2007 EU Strategy for Central Asia.  
Central Asia is a key region for both AIIB 
activities and the land dimension of BRI. Once 
updated, the strategy could formulate specific 
instructions as to how the EU intends to utilise 
its relations with the countries of the region to 
pursue the above objective. Bearing in mind 
the demand-driven nature of the AIIB, it is for 
project promoters to approach the bank with 
project plans and not vice-versa. In this regard, 
it will be critical for the EU to work with 
Central Asian governments and business actors 
on the ground, through its delegations and the 
EU Special Representative to Central Asia 
reinstated in April 2015, to identify 
connectivity projects consistent with the 
objective of enhancing land connections 
between Europe and Asia, bypassing Russia. In 
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this regard, the EU could also make strategic 
use of the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
which operates in several Central Asian 
countries (Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan) has also signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the AIIB with a view to 
paving the way towards co-financing projects.  
This could also form part of the development 
of an EU economic diplomacy towards the 
region and open up opportunities under the 
EU-China Connectivity Platform. 
 
In addition, with European countries holding 
nearly a fifth of AIIB shares, it would not be 
unreasonable for the EU to advocate for 
expanding the geographical scope of AIIB 
activities towards Europe in the medium to 
long-term.  Especially, Eastern Partnership 
countries, Central and Eastern Europe 
(grouped in the 16+1 cooperation format), but 
also other interested European countries with 
infrastructural needs, such as those in Southern 
Europe, could provide opportunities for the 
bank to do business. This would also be 
consistent with President Liqun‟s recent 
remark that the “AIIB can support 
infrastructure investment outside of Asia as 
long as the projects benefit the local and Asian 
development.”
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 This could distinguish the 
bank from other regional multilateral 
development banks, such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) or the African 
Development Bank, which tend to focus on 
the region of their location with non-regional 
members being able to benefit from their 
activities only through the participation of their 
businesses in project tenders.     
 
A potential EU success in linking AIIB 
activities to its close neighbourhood as well as 
EU countries with infrastructure needs could 
also have a positive impact on the perception 
of EU institutions in these regions. 
Infrastructure shortage remains a pressing issue 
indeed in certain parts of the EU despite the 
availability of cohesion and structural funds (in 
the utilisation of which beneficiary countries 
face certain restrictions) and the more than 
five-year long existence of the China-financed 
16+1 platform which has, so far, struggled to 
provide smooth financing for grandiose 
physical infrastructure projects (e.g. Budapest-
Belgrade railway modernisation). 
 
STANDARD STANDARDS? 
Despite the AIIB‟s declared intention to be 
„lean, clean and green‟ from the outset, 
Western observers, in general, followed the 
initial evolution of the bank with a sense of 
suspicion. They feared that the AIIB would 
operate with lenient social and environmental 
policies (thus placing orthodox MDBs‟ 
standards under downward pressure) and 
further Chinese domestic policy objectives (e.g. 
mitigating industrial overcapacities, creating 
business opportunities for state-owned 
companies) backed by Beijing‟s quasi veto 
power (27.84%) over substantive decisions 
(requiring 75% of total votes) and enabled also 
through the non-resident nature of the board 
of directors.  
 
Arguably, however, the AIIB‟s evolution has 
proven most – if not all – of these allegations 
wrong. In fact, there is a now an increasingly 
broad agreement across Western capitals on 
the bank‟s close alignment with policies and 
standards of established MDBs.  The bank‟s 
Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), 
for example, is largely reflective of extant 
MDBs‟ ESF. It recognises many of the topical 
issues framing development policy at present, 
including climate change, gender, biodiversity 
and ecosystems, resettlement, labour practices 
and indigenous peoples‟ rights. The document 
also lays significant emphasis on transparency, 
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information disclosure and public participation, 
far exceeding those of China‟s main national 
development banks. Rather than operating 
exclusively based on its own standards, the 
AIIB, upon request from the client (whether 
public or private) may decide to use all or part of 
the client‟s existing environmental and social 
management system for all or part of the project. 
This is in line with recent efforts of peer MDBs 
(see the revision of the World Bank‟s ESF in 
August 2016) to opt for reliance on country 
systems whenever possible. 
 
The institution – which has an initial capital base 
of USD 100 billion – has also signed a range of 
MoUs with established MDBs (e.g. the World 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, ADB etc.) in order to 
facilitate co-financing and fostering co-operation 
at the strategic and technical levels on the basis 
of complementarity. Out of the 13 projects 
approved by the board by early May, 11 are to 
be co-financed (in US dollar) with other MDBs 
in which case the AIIB often relies on partners‟ 
safeguard policies be it about procurement, 
disbursements, environmental and social 
compliance, and project monitoring and 
reporting.  
 
In light of the above, the question does not 
seem to be so much about whether the AIIB will 
abide by the general standards guiding the 
activities of established MDBs but whether 
China will use the AIIB as a learning experience 
and transpose its approaches to its own „policy 
banks‟. This, however, does not mean that EU 
member states present in the AIIB should sit on 
their hands as far as standards are concerned. 
Drawing on the practices of the EIB, EU 
member states could, for example, advocate for 
a stronger alignment of the bank‟s activities with 
international agendas such as the 2015 Paris 
Agreement and the Agenda 2030 through the 
incorporation of climate action indicators (e.g. 
linking certain percentage of annual AIIB 
lending to climate action) and the formulation of 
a dedicated SDG or gender strategy. The AIIB‟s 
current performance indicators focus on annual 
lending volume ambitions and the expected 
contribution of AIIB-financed projects to the 
GDP growth of beneficiary countries, whereas 
the EIB is, for example, bound to dedicate a 
minimum of 25% of its annual lending to 
climate action.   
 
EU VOICE 
Finally, in order for the EU to maximise its 
influence and successfully promote the above 
objectives within the bank, an adequate co-
ordination among EU members of the AIIB will 
be paramount.  The AIIB‟s Articles of 
Agreement (AoA) currently does not allow for 
the membership (be it as a full member, 
enhanced observer or ordinary observer) of non-
state actors (e.g. the EU) and changing this 
situation (through the incorporation of a 
Regional Integration Clause) would require an 
amendment of the AoA.
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 On the board of 
directors, AIIB members are currently divided 
into 12 constituencies, each of which is 
represented by a director on the board. In 
contrast to the World Bank and the IMF, EU 
member states are not scattered across the board 
but are grouped into just two constituencies. 
One of these comprises ten Eurozone members, 
which essentially constitutes the first instance of 
a unified representation arrangement for the 
single-currency area in an international 
organisation. The other includes four non-
Eurozone EU members along with Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland.  
 
So far, EU-level discussions on AIIB business 
have mostly been carried out through 
COREPER meetings in Brussels. Furthermore, 
AIIB matters have also been discussed regularly 
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at meetings of heads and deputy heads of 
mission in Beijing.  In view of the growing 
number of EU member states edging towards 
membership, co-ordination could be 
strengthened further through a regular 
consultation between Brussels-based economic 
and financial counselors of EU member states as 
well as between their Beijing-based counterparts 
under the auspices of the EU delegation, 
possibly including also the head of EIB office in 
Beijing. Such meetings could also involve 
representatives from other European countries 
(Norway, Switzerland), and like-minded 
countries (New Zealand, Australia, Canada). 
Such face-to-face coordination on a regular basis 
would be of particular importance given the 
non-resident nature of the AIIB‟s board of 
directors.  
 
In the medium term, the EU could also push for 
observer status for international financial 
institutions within the AIIB. This could, for 
example, pave the way for the EIB‟s presence in 
the body which could serve as an additional 
lever of influence for the EU to shape the 
standards and norms guiding AIIB-funded 
projects. As opposed to the AIIB, observer 
status is already possible for international 
financial institutions (IFIs) on the board of 
governors of the above-mentioned New 
Development Bank. Enabling observer status 
for IFIs would, nonetheless, require changing 
the AoA through a super majority vote of the 
board of governors, which requires “an 
affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total 
number of Governors, representing not less 
than three-fourths of the total voting power of 
the members.”6  
 
And, finally, the question arises: what influence 
will Brexit have on the EU‟s voice in the AIIB? 
On the board of directors, the UK currently 
represents the group that includes non-
Eurozone EU members and three other 
European countries.
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 After Brexit, the UK will 
continue to be an important partner for the EU 
in trying to ensure the alignment of AIIB 
standards with those of established MDBs. At 
the same time, it can be expected that the 
country‟s China-friendly policy as initiated under 
former Prime Minister Cameron and former 
Chancellor Osborne will continue after the snap 
elections of this June. As a result, once divorced 
from the EU, the UK may also opt for taking a 
softer stance on AIIB standards in the hope of 
securing better relations with China post-Brexit. 
Hence, the importance of firmly involving the 
UK in EU coordination mechanisms both 
before and after Brexit, ensuring also close 
cooperation between the two European 
groupings in the AIIB. 
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Parts of the argumentation presented in this 
policy brief were developed in the context of 
the MERICS European China Talent 
Program 2017, which was hosted by the 
Mercator Institute for China Studies in 
Berlin in April 2017. While the authors have 
benefited from the feedback of MERICS 
researchers, they bear sole responsibility for 
the content of this policy brief. 
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Endnotes 
1Arguably, another reason China has put its support behind the AIIB and, in cooperation with other 
BRICS, the NDB is Beijing‟s realisation that multilateral negotiations through institutions often have a 
bigger chance of success at tackling development challenges than bilateral encounters, especially in Asia. 
2 The membership request of Belgium, Ireland and Hungary – along with that of another 10 states – was 
approved by the AIIB Board of Governors on 23 March 2017. On 13 May, a further three EU member 
states (Cyprus, Greece and Romania) obtained a green light. They will officially join the AIIB once they 
complete the required domestic processes and deposit the first instalment of capital with the Bank. 
3 Russia has the third largest voting power in the AIIB, holding 6.33% of total votes. 
4 Li, Xiang (25 March 2017) AIIB welcomes 13 new members, 15 to join the queue. Chinadaily. 
Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/25/content_28677254.htm 
5 It was such an amendment that allowed the EU, for example, to become a full member of the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation in 1991. 
6 AIIB Articles of Agreement, Art. 28 
7 Directors are elected for terms of two years, with the possibility of re-election. The British director 
represents the group of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
